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1BEKENDSTELLING
Pierre Erasmus is op 19 Julie 1975 op Caledon gebore en het in die Rûens op die plaas Waboomskloof 
grootgeword. In 1989 verruil hy die Overberg vir die 
Paarl, waar hy as ‘Boishaaier’ sy hoërskoolloopbaan 
in 1993 aan die Hoër Jongenskool Paarl voltooi. In 
1996 behaal hy die graad BCom (Wiskunde) aan die 
Universiteit Stellenbosch (US), gevolg deur ’n BCom-
honneursgraad in Finansiële Rekeningkunde ’n jaar later. 
Alhoewel finansiële bestuur nie een van sy voorgraadse 
hoofvakke was nie, besluit hy om dit in sy honneursjaar 
as keusevak te neem. Min het hy geweet dat hierdie 
keuse tot ’n loopbaan in die akademie sou lei.
Ná sy honneursjaar was Pierre op pad na die 
Barossavallei in Australië om as assistent in die wynkelders 
van die bekende landgoed Yalumba te gaan werk, toe 
professor Izak Lambrechts hom ’n pos as junior lektor in 
die US se Departement Ondernemingsbestuur aanbied. 
Nadat hy aanvanklik die aanbod van die hand gewys het, 
besluit hy tog om tydelik na Stellenbosch terug te keer 
om ’n magistergraad te voltooi. Dié tydelike terugkeer 
duur uiteindelik heelwat langer as die beplande twee jaar, 
en hy verwerf in 2001 sy MCom (Ondernemingsbestuur) 
met lof, gevolg deur ’n PhD in Ondernemingsbestuur 
in 2008. Op 1 Januarie 2013 word hy bevorder tot 
professor in die Departement Ondernemingsbestuur.
Gedurende sy akademiese loopbaan publiseer 
hy artikels in verskeie plaaslike en internasionale 
vaktydskrifte en lewer talle referate by nasionale sowel 
as internasionale kongresse. Hy is die mede-outeur van 
sewe handboeke oor finansiële bestuur. Pierre ontvang in 
2009 die Rektorstoekenning vir Voortreflike Navorsing, 
en in 2010 ken die Nasionale Navorsingstigting ’n Y2-
gradering aan hom toe.
Pierre is ’n passievolle dosent wat uitnemende 
onderrig aan studente wil bied om sodoende erkenning 
te gee aan die uitstekende onderwysers en dosente 
wat ’n impak op sy eie ontwikkeling gehad het. Hierdie 
strewe besorg hom sedert 2011 jaarliks ’n plek as finalis 
in Die Burger se topdosentkompetisie. Hy gee ook klas in 
finansiële bestuur aan die Universiteit van Utrecht (sedert 
2007) en die Nyenrode-bestuursuniversiteit (2015) in 
Nederland, sowel as aan die Universiteit van Gotland 
(nou die Gotland-kampus van die Universiteit van 
Uppsala) in Swede (2011 en 2012). In samewerking met 
die ASISA Akademie verskaf hy boonop praktykgerigte 
opleiding in die finansiële en beleggingsbedryf.
Sy klasse konsentreer hoofsaaklik op finansiële 
beplanning en vooruitskatting, met bepaalde klem 
op die impak van kapitaalinvestering en die keuse van 
kapitaalstruktuur op finansiële waardasie. In sy navorsing 
ondersoek hy vraagstukke met betrekking tot die 
voortbrenging van volhoubare aandeelhouerswelvaart, 
met erkenning van die noodsaaklike rol wat korporatiewe 
sosiale verantwoordbaarheid daarin speel. As sulks het 
hy ’n renons in die blindelingse najaag van korttermyn 
finansiële prestasie by beleggers, en hoop hy om deur 
sy klasse en navorsing ’n beskeie bydrae tot meer 
verantwoordelike besluitneming te lewer.
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The qualities most useful to ourselves are, first of all, superior reasons and understanding, by which we are capable 
of discerning the remote consequences of all our actions; and, secondly, self-command, by which we are enabled to 
abstain from present pleasure or to endure present pain in order to obtain a greater pleasure in some future time.
                                                                                                                           Adam Smith, 1759
For most of these persons are, in fact, largely concerned, not with making superior long-term forecasts of the 
probable yield of an investment over its whole life, but with foreseeing changes in the conventional basis of valuation 
a short time ahead of the general public. They are concerned, not with what an investment is really worth to a man 
who buys it ‘for keeps’, but with what the market will value it at, under the influence of mass psychology, three 
months or a year hence.
                                                                                                              John Milton Keynes, 1936
INTRODUCTION
The world seems to be moving faster and faster. Bombarded with an ever-expanding stream of new 
information and facing rapid technological change, we are 
experiencing intensified pressure to deliver immediate 
results. Nowhere is this more apparent than in capital 
markets. Investors harness sophisticated technology 
to gather, analyse and interpret information and react 
to new information almost instantaneously. Corporate 
managers’ ability to churn out satisfactory returns to 
shareholders is under constant scrutiny. In the era of 
“quarterly capitalism” (Barton, 2011: 86; Millon, 2002: 
890), time is indeed money – requiring measurement 
“in nanoseconds rather than milliseconds” (Budish, 
Cramton & Shim, 2015).
Surviving in such a fast-paced environment requires 
the ability to keep abreast of technological change, 
leading to significant changes in our behaviour. Advances 
in technological innovation not only influence how we 
behave, however, but may also have an impact on the way 
we think. Adapting to the challenges of the information 
revolution may have produced a neurological rewiring 
of our brain (Carr, 2011), resulting in a shortened 
attention span (Haldane & Davies, 2011: 1). The benefits 
associated with technological innovation therefore may 
have come at a cognitive cost.
Despite concerns regarding increased short-
sighted behaviour by shareholders and corporate 
management being raised by the business community 
for some time, empirical evidence assessing the causes 
and the consequences of this change in behaviour 
remains limited (Dallas, 2012: 268; Bøhren, Priestley & 
Ødegaard, 2009: 3). Given our poor understanding of 
the role short-termism played during the global financial 
crisis, I find myself sharing the concerns of those who 
feel that, if left unchecked, short-termism could severely 
disrupt long-term sustainable value creation (Davies, 
Haldane, Nielsen & Pezzini, 2014: 16; Dallas, 2012: 269; 
Rappaport, 2011: 5; Dobbs, 2009: 127).
In this inaugural address, I will discuss how short-
termism impacts on corporate finance. I will start by 
providing an overview of short-termism by explaining 
how it influences our behaviour and the resulting impact 
on financial markets. Given the damaging consequences 
increased investor short-termism and managerial myopia 
could have on corporate performance and sustainability, 
I will then reflect on whether technological innovation 
and inappropriate incentives could have contributed to 
these two forms of short-termism. In conclusion, I will 
identify ways to reduce short-termism by referring to 
some of the problem areas I have identified.
SHORT-TERMISM: CONFLICT 
BETWEEN INSTANT GRATIFICATION 
AND SELF-CONTROL
Short-termism can be defined as a way of thinking or planning that is concentrated on short-term projects 
or objectives (that will yield immediate advantages or 
profits), at the expense of long-term security (Oxford 
Dictionaries, 2014). It therefore refers to a type of 
behaviour where short-term rewards are optimised with 
total disregard for subsequent long-term outcomes. In 
its extreme form, it entails selecting a suboptimal course 
of action that yields the best short-term results, even 
if this may prove to be destructive over the long term 
(Laverty, 1996: 826).
Short-termism is not a new phenomenon, but has 
been part of human nature since the earliest stages of our 
4development (Rappaport, 2011: 4). Early hunter-gatherer 
societies focused on their immediate requirements, and 
were able to satisfy their needs with small amounts 
of work. In this environment, characterised by scarce 
resources and infrequent opportunities, the human brain 
adapted to prioritise immediate rewards and costs and 
to disregard those that occur in the future (Roberts, 
2014). Considering that the average life expectancy 
remained at a level of between 30 and 40 years from 
100 000 BC until as recently as the 1800s, there was no 
real need to be saving for the long term (Clark, 2009: 94; 
Kremer, 1993).
The type of short-term behaviour exhibited by our 
early ancestors is associated with activity in the limbic 
(or midbrain dopamine) part of the brain (McClure, 
Laibson, Loewenstein & Cohen, 2004: 503). Our current 
environment, however, differs substantially from the one 
where this type of behaviour was essential for survival. 
The modern-day need for instant gratification is easily 
satisfied by an economy that specialises in delivering 
immediate rewards, while effortlessly deferring the 
associated costs (Roberts, 2014). Addiction is another 
remnant of our early behaviour. Drugs release dopamine, 
which stimulates the limbic part of the brain associated 
with instant reward. The craving for instant gratification 
triggers an accelerating self-destructive cycle that will 
continue towards total destruction unless some form of 
intervention takes place (Madden, Petry, Badger & Bickel, 
1997; Becker & Mulligan, 1997: 729; Bickel, Odum & 
Madden, 1999; Petry, 2001; Vuchinich & Simpson, 1998).
Given our inherent bias towards the immediate and 
the certain even when a distant and less certain alternative 
is likely to be more valuable, we need to recognise the 
effect this could have on our behaviour when faced 
with difficult intertemporal decisions (Thaler & Shefrin, 
1981: 392). This tendency to discount future outcomes 
more aggressively than near-term ones was discussed 
more than a century ago by economists like Marshall 
(1890) and Jevons (1871). Pigou (1920) described 
myopic discounting as a “defective telescopic faculty”. 
In addition to being myopic, discounting also appears to 
be inconsistent over time. As distant outcomes come 
closer to the present, we start to alter our preferences 
(Angeletos, Laibson, Repetto, Tobacman & Weinberg, 
2001: 47; Laibson, 1997: 444), in what has been termed 
“hyperbolic discounting” (Ainslie & Haslam, 1992).
Short-termism holds profound implications for 
economic and financial systems. Instant gratification 
today comes at the expense of saving for the future. 
Under-saving, in turn, impacts negatively on long-run 
investment and economic growth. Short-termism could 
also manifest in over-borrowing: using credit to pay 
for current needs diminishes your future earnings and 
substitutes it with financial obligations. Similarly, the 
propensity to realise investments earlier rather than 
later could result in over-trading (Haldane, 2010: 7). 
It is argued that financial innovation may have further 
contributed to declining savings rates by increasing 
liquidity and eliminating commitment opportunities 
(Laibson, 1997: 443).
Well-functioning capital markets are an important 
determinant of growth (Levine & Zervos, 1998: 537; 
Levine, 1997: 688). By their very nature, capital markets 
require patience – transferring savings today into 
investment tomorrow that will generate future growth 
(Haldane & Davies, 2011: 1). If short-termism disrupts 
the transfer of savings that occur on capital markets it 
would not only undermine economic growth, but also 
have a negative impact on the financial well-being of all 
the market participants (Rappaport, 2011: 5).
In developing countries like South Africa, the 
negative impact that short-termism has on the economy 
is amplified by some additional factors. To survive on 
limited means absorbs a large amount of cognitive 
energy, exaggerating short-term focused behaviour 
among the poor (Shah, Mullainathan & Shafir, 2012: 682). 
Some of the consequences of this myopic behaviour are 
insufficient saving for retirement and over-borrowing 
from micro lenders. This short-term behaviour also 
offers a partial explanation for the debt-trap observed 
in developing countries (Banerjee & Duflo, 2012). The 
increased tempo of technological innovation and an 
increasingly competitive global market has also widened 
the gap between winners and losers, encouraging 
companies to plan and operate over shorter time frames 
(Garcia, 2005).
The increased tempo of technological innovation 
not only resulted in a shortening of corporate planning 
and operating periods, but also led to a huge amount of 
information being generated, with almost 99 per cent of 
total information created over the last century (Haldane, 
2015: 18). Although increasing technological innovation 
holds benefits, it is argued that our response to this 
information overload may come at a cognitive cost in 
the form of shortened attention spans (Carr, 2008). 
As a result we may be adopting shorter-term decision 
making, which holds important implications for growth, 
innovation and the development of skills (Hutton, 2015). 
Short-sighted behaviour can reduce creativity, reducing 
the development of intellectual capital (Urminsky & 
Zauberman, 2015). Impatience has also been shown to 
impact on educational achievement, translating into less 
favourable future income prospects (Mischel, 2014).
Up to this point, I have sketched a rather bleak picture 
depicting the problems associated with our inherent 
propensity for short-sighted behaviour. The resulting 
failure to make provision for sufficient long-term savings, 
reliance on the extensive use of credit, frequent trading 
and shorter decision-making timeframes represent an 
uncomfortably close resemblance to the self-destructive 
5cycle associated with addiction (O’Donoghue & Rabin, 
2002). What I find even more disconcerting, however, 
is the realisation that this is not an entirely unfamiliar 
scenario, but one that corresponds to actual conditions 
we have been observing in our economic and financial 
systems for a considerable number of years. Should 
we interpret this as an indication that we have lost our 
ability to practise self-control?
Adam Smith (1759) describes the importance of self-
command by referring to the benefits associated with 
delaying present pleasure to some future point in time. 
Patience is therefore not only a virtue, but enables us 
to overcome the limitations of our myopic behaviour in 
order to increase our welfare over the long term. This 
internal conflict we face when having to select between 
instant gratification and delayed rewards is reflected in 
the “double-self” principle (Haldane, 2010: 5), based on 
the work by psychologists and philosophers like Freud 
(1958) and Berlin (1969). In the field of behavioural 
finance, the influence of self-control on our approach 
towards intertemporal choices is explained by a similar 
distinction between a “farsighted planner” and a “myopic 
doer” (Thaler & Shefrin, 1981: 392).
Brain imaging technology suggests that self-control 
is associated with the pre-frontal cortex of the brain 
(Figner, Knoch, Johnson, Krosch, Lisanby, Fehr & 
Weber, 2010: 538; McClure et al., 2004: 503). This is 
the part of the brain that has developed most recently, 
with evidence suggesting it formed more or less 30 000 
to 50 000 years ago. The evolution of the pre-frontal 
cortex enabled patience to become one of our distinctive 
human characteristics. Increased self-control and greater 
patience in adults can also be linked to the development 
of the pre-frontal cortex with age (Haldane, 2010: 3).
Research indicates that a greater degree of self-
control can be expected to have a positive impact on the 
development of economic and financial systems. Greater 
self-control should generate increased household savings 
that can be used to finance investment by companies. 
Capital accumulation by companies, in turn, should fuel 
future output, contributing to economic growth (Levine, 
1997: 688; Levine & Renelt, 1992). Since the transfer 
of savings requires the intermediation provided by 
capital markets, self-control is also expected to enhance 
financial systems (Haldane, 2010: 4). By facilitating an 
efficient transfer of savings and increasing the rewards 
for delaying consumption, financial intermediaries can 
encourage saving and promote growth (Levine & Zervos, 
1998: 537).
To understand why individuals would be prepared to 
place constraints on their future behaviour, Fisher (1930) 
explained intertemporal choice in terms of consumers’ 
time preference for comparatively early income over 
comparatively remote, or deferred, income. The rate 
of time preference (or degree of impatience) reflects 
a consumer’s willingness to defer consumption today 
for future benefit (Haldane, 2015: 11). The rate of 
time preference depends on the size, distribution and 
probability of a consumer’s income, as well as a number 
of personal characteristics. These characteristics 
include short-sightedness, poor self-control, the habit 
of spending freely, an emphasis on the shortness and 
uncertainty of life, selfishness and slavish following of the 
whims of fashion (Fisher, 1930). The more patient an 
individual is, the lower his or her rate of time preference 
would therefore be.
Most economic models assume permanent income 
and lifecycle preferences (Blackorby, Nissen, Primont 
& Russell, 1973: 239). When considering real-world 
behaviour, this assumption is not often satisfied, with 
evidence that time preferences change, among others, 
with age and social class (Thaler & Shefrin, 1981; Bishai, 
2004), level of poverty (Lawrance, 1991: 54) and aggregate 
future consumption (Epstein & Hynes, 1983: 611). Risk 
preferences also change during losing streaks, adding to 
high-risk, short-term behaviour (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979: 289). It is important to note that incorporating a 
non-constant discount rate in discounted utility models 
will take the form of temporary myopia or impulsive 
behaviour (Strotz, 1955).
When presented with long-term decisions, we 
are therefore for all intents and purposes, in two 
minds – facing an internal conflict between the lower-
level automatic responses of our brain that evolved in 
response to specific environments and our more recently 
developed general cognitive abilities that support 
abstract reasoning and long-term planning (McClure et 
al., 2004: 506). To complicate this “internal struggle for 
self-command” (Schelling, 1984) even further, visceral 
factors can exert a significant impact on our behaviour 
(Loewenstein, 1996: 288). Visceral factors can result 
in impulsive behaviour that is detrimental to our self-
interest (Rick & Loewenstein, 2008).
Three areas of behaviour that are influenced by 
visceral factors have specific consequences for economic 
behaviour (Loewenstein, 2000: 429). Firstly, bargaining 
behaviour appears to be influenced by emotions like 
anger, fear and embarrassment, and could cause us to 
act in ways that are detrimental to our own economic 
interests. Secondly, when facing decision making under 
risk and uncertainty, we appear to fear the known 
far more than the unknown. Finally, it is also argued 
that instinctive factors play an important role during 
intertemporal choice, and could amplify our already 
inherent bias towards extreme discounting of the future 
even further. Our immediate emotions at the time we 
make decisions may override our cognitive behaviour, 
even if we recognise the detrimental long-term 
consequences of our decision at the moment we are 
making the decision (Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992: 595). 
6Recognising the implications of this type of behaviour 
therefore becomes critical when making important, 
long-term decisions during periods characterised by 
increased levels of emotion.
One area where emotion fuels behaviour that 
seems to defy expectations is financial markets. Investor 
sentiment has been shown to distort market prices 
on financial markets, often resulting in deviations from 
fundamental values (De Long, Shleifer, Summers & 
Waldmann, 1990: 735). Conventional finance theory 
predicts that rational investors would respond to 
these deviations and force prices back to fundamental 
values through the process of arbitrage (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997: 35). Rational investors, however, often 
face limits to arbitrage in the form of high costs and 
risks associated with correcting sentimental mispricing. 
Research has shown that the ‘irrational’ behaviour 
resulting from investor sentiment often has a substantial 
and prolonged effect on prices (Barberis & Thaler, 2002: 
2). Even though investors appear to comprehend that 
investor psychology could cause market prices to differ 
from fundamental values (Shiller, 1987: 1), conventional 
finance theory fails to reflect the impact that investor 
behaviour could have on asset prices (Barberis and 
Thaler, 2002: 3).
During periods of particularly strong investor 
sentiment, market prices sometimes move to unrealistic 
levels. If this situation persists for a substantial period of 
time, it could eventually result in a financial crisis (Baker 
& Wurgler, 2007: 129). Investor sentiment thus increases 
the probability of an occurrence of a financial crisis, 
such as the 2007–2009 global financial crisis (Zouaoui, 
Nouyrigat & Beer, 2011: 723). This crisis not only had 
a devastating impact on financial markets, but also 
caused severe damage to the world economy (Dallas, 
2012: 268). In the aftermath of the crisis, recessions and 
negative investment sentiment caused an increase in the 
cost of external financing, resulting in limited investment 
and low employment (McLean & Zhao, 2014: 1377).
INVESTOR SHORT-TERMISM AND 
MANAGERIAL MYOPIA
Following the collapse of the technology bubble during the early 2000s, numerous studies revealed that 
increased speculative activity from 1998 to 2000 caused 
market prices to deviate substantially from fundamental 
values for a prolonged period of time (Malkiel, 2003; 
Lamont & Thaler, 2003; Ofek & Richardson, 2003). Even 
though the collapse of the technology bubble destroyed 
billions in shareholder value and resulted in the loss of 
more than 100 000 jobs, executives of the 25 largest 
technology companies that were suffering the most 
severe losses managed to accumulate $3,3 billion from 
strategically timed sales of their share options (Bolton, 
Scheinkman & Xiong, 2006: 577).
A more alarming discovery, though, was that 
managerial short-termism could have been fuelled by 
the speculative motives of their current shareholders 
and amplified by incentives rewarding short-term 
share performance (Bolton et al., 2006: 579). Existing 
shareholders, succumbing to their primitive need 
for immediate rewards, would be able to profit 
from over-optimistic future investors by inducing 
management behaviour that increases speculative 
activity in the market. Given the link between share-
based compensation and earnings management (Jones 
& Wu, 2010: 1; Bergstresser & Philippon, 2006: 511; 
Peng & Roell, 2008: 141), this behaviour provides a 
strong incentive for earnings manipulation. The resulting 
mispricing of a company’s shares also increases the risk of 
over-investment in inefficient projects that will become 
unsustainable once market prices return to appropriate 
levels (Polk & Sapienza, 2004: 2). Although these 
consequences of speculative activity could be mitigated 
by increased corporate governance, regulatory limits 
on short-term speculative activities may be required to 
prevent corporate failure (Bolton et al., 2006: 598).
During the period preceding the most recent financial 
crisis, investors and corporate management by and large 
ignored repeated appeals from the business community 
expressing concern over short-termism (Dallas, 2012: 
268). These concerns were based on a number of trends 
consistent with increasing levels of short-termism that 
were observed over the last three decades. Stock 
markets (including the JSE) experienced an expansion in 
the volume of equity trading (Pozen, 2014: 3), an increase 
in stock turnover (Krehmeyer, Orsagh & Schacht, 2006: 
11) and shorter holding periods of investors (Allaire & 
Firsirotu, 2007: 3) during this period. The average tenure 
of chief executive officers (CEOs) also showed a marked 
decline over time (Favaro, Karlsson & Nielson, 2015: 9; 
Karlsson, Neilson & Webster, 2008: 2). Companies also 
reduced their spending on research and development 
(R&D) (Roychowdhury, 2006: 337).
Reports released by the Aspen Institute (2009: 
2) warn that short-term behaviour is not limited to 
a few investors or intermediaries, but is a system-
wide problem involving corporate management, 
boards, investment advisers, providers of capital, and 
government. The CFA Centre for Financial Market 
Integrity and the Business Roundtable Institute for 
Corporate Ethics also acknowledge the significance of 
short-termism in a 2006 report, referring to an excessive 
focus on short-term quarterly earnings at the expense 
of long-term strategy, fundamentals, and conventional 
approaches to value creation by some corporate 
managers, investors, and analysts. The CFA report also 
summarises recommendations on solving short-termism 
obtained from various stakeholder groups (Krehmeyer 
et al., 2006: 4).
7Along a similar vein, a perspectives paper published 
by the Global Network of Director Institutes (2014) 
suggests that managers of large listed companies exhibit 
imbalanced decision making, favouring short-term 
objectives, and recommends that the focus should shift 
towards long-term issues to ensure future sustainability. 
Management’s behaviour is ascribed to investors’ 
demands for short-term results, as well as compensation 
incentives that favour short-term performance.
A series of high-profile business scandals (such as 
Enron and WorldCom) provided additional evidence 
that share-based incentives were indeed motivating 
management to resort to earnings management (Fisch, 
2006: 673; Healy & Palepu, 2003: 3; Rappaport, 2005: 
69). It becomes clear that the problems associated with 
inappropriate incentives were identified and reported 
extensively towards the mid-2000s. Investors, however, 
continued to reward management for achieving short-
term results rather than long-term value creation 
(Rappaport, 2011: 6), allowing short-termism to 
proliferate.
The devastating impact of short-term oriented 
behaviour on financial markets was reaffirmed during the 
2007–2009 global financial crisis (Roberts, 2014), causing 
market volatility to escalate and endangering the stability 
of financial institutions (Duruigbo, 2011: 541). Unless 
decisive action is taken to diminish short-termism on 
financial markets, financial stability and economic activity 
will remain under threat (Davies et al., 2014: 16; Dallas, 
2012: 269).
Investor short-termism and managerial myopia 
represent two distinct but interconnected dimensions of 
financial market short-termism (Moore & Walker-Arnott, 
2014: 423). Short-termism is predominately observed at 
investor level in financial markets, with several studies 
suggesting that shareholders may overvalue short-
term performance and pressure management to inflate 
performance measures or adjust strategies even if it may 
be harmful for the company over the long term (Jackson 
& Petraki, 2011: 12). This behaviour undermines the 
ability of companies to create stable employment and 
sustainable value (Duruigbo, 2011: 580).
There is a strong, ubiquitous perception that 
investors (shareholders) are increasingly focused on 
the short-term (Marston & Craven, 1998: 233). Those 
that hold this view claim that investors base their 
expectations about firms and investment decision 
making on short-term performance measures (Latham & 
Braun, 2010: 368). Testing the nature of the interaction 
between management and shareholders, however, is 
difficult (Frentrop, 2012: 7) and despite repeated calls 
to substantiate predominantly anecdotal evidence 
of financial market short-termism with more formal 
results, empirical evidence remains limited (Davies et al., 
2014: 16).
Applying a basic forward-looking asset-pricing 
framework, Miles (1993) developed a quantitative model 
that directly tests for short-termism by comparing 
the implicit discount rates investors used to discount 
expected future cash flows occurring at different points 
in time. Results from this study provided quantitative 
evidence that United Kingdom (UK) investors applied 
excessive discounting of future cash flows (Miles, 1993: 
1394). Subsequent studies based on modified versions 
of this model reported similar results for UK and 
United States (US) companies (Chou & Guo, 2004: 115; 
Davies et al., 2014: 21). It also emerges that UK and 
US markets appear to be more susceptible to short-
termism compared to other countries (Black & Fraser, 
2002: 136). All these results seem to justify claims that 
investors place too much weight on current profits and 
dividends (Marsh, 1992: 446–452) and disproportionally 
discount longer-term cash flows (Bushee, 2001: 211).
When considering investor short-termism, an 
important distinction between speculative trading and 
earnings-based investment could be made (Moore & 
Walker-Arnott, 2014: 424). Speculative trading refers 
to an extreme form of investor short-termism where 
holding periods are usually less than one day (sometimes 
even measured in seconds or milliseconds). These 
high-frequency trades are performed on the basis of 
anticipated changes in market attitudes towards a 
company’s shares, and bear little relation to its financial 
performance. The main disadvantage of high-frequency 
trading is increased stock market volatility. In contrast, 
earnings-based investment focuses exclusively on a 
company’s actual or expected earnings and would have 
an impact on earnings management.
Pressure from shareholders demanding earnings is 
transferred to corporate management through financial 
markets, where the failure to deliver will result in the 
depreciation of the company’s share price (Groot, 1998: 
215; Jensen, 2005: 5). As a result, corporate management 
is under pressure to deliver positive and stable financial 
performance on a constant basis. Academic research and 
surveys (Marston & Craven, 1998; Graham, Harvey & 
Rajgopal, 2005; Haldane & Davies, 2011) have indicated 
that corporate executives perceive investors and the 
stock market as being short-term oriented.
There is substantial support for the idea that 
management and investor orientations are reinforced 
by interaction with each other in such a way that these 
orientations ultimately lead to the shortening of time 
horizons (Bolton et al., 2006: 580). The resulting short-
termist behaviour could be intensified by financial market 
participants, such as institutional investors, who mediate 
the interaction between these two parties. Short-
termism therefore reflects the complex interaction 
between the incentives and preferences of investors, 
financial market intermediaries and corporate managers 
8in what has been termed the double-agency problem 
(Frentrop, 2012: 45).
The investment industry is often criticised for 
operating over relatively short periods of time 
(Clearfield, 2005: 118), resulting in shorter holding 
periods and increased trading volumes. Fund managers 
are usually evaluated and compensated based on 
monthly or quarterly returns (Kay, 2012: 41), and these 
short-term incentives could contribute to increased 
pressure on corporate management to deliver short-
term results. Based on their large shareholding in a 
company, institutional investors also have the power to 
exert pressure on the company in an attempt to profit 
from influencing the share price over the short term, 
even if this comes at the expense of other stakeholders 
in the firm (Lipton & Rosenblum, 2003: 78). The size 
of their shareholding, however, also allows institutional 
investors to perform a monitoring role that could 
reduce short-sighted corporate behaviour and improve 
corporate governance (Chen, Harford & Li, 2007: 279).
The extent to which institutional investors have 
contributed to investor short-termism is not entirely 
clear. Evidence that short-termist investors, such as 
financial institutions, destroy firm value has been reported 
(Bøhren et al., 2009: 2), with a positive relationship 
observed between the ownership period and the 
amount of value destroyed. The presence of short-term 
institutional investors has also been associated with a 
higher agency cost of debt (Kim, Mantecon & Songa, 
2015: 25). Speculative short-term institutional investors 
could also support takeover transactions even if it is at 
the expense of long-term shareholders or has a negative 
impact on the economy (Lipton, 1979: 112).
There appears to be evidence, however, that 
institutional investors in general are not short-sighted 
(Bushee, 2004; 2001; 1998). Institutional investors 
are heterogeneous, reflecting different investment 
behaviours. Only one group of institutional investors, 
classified as transient investors, is characterised by 
short-term preferences (Bushee, 2004: 31). These 
investors pursue short-term profits through high rates 
of turnover. They invest on the basis of technical factors 
such as momentum trading, rather than company 
fundamentals (Rappaport, 2005: 66). These investors 
provide limited monitoring of companies’ long-term 
performance.
The majority of the damaging effects of short-termism 
originate from the behaviour of transient institutional 
investors (Pozen, 2014: 4). A company is more likely to 
cut R&D expenses to meet short-term earnings targets 
(Bushee, 2004: 307), reflect accrual errors and publish 
financial restatements (Burns, Kedia & Lipson, 2010: 
443) and experience material weaknesses in internal 
controls (Tang & Xu, 2010: 93) if a transient investor 
becomes a dominant shareholder.
Management myopia refers to the situation where 
corporate management, acting to improve its own 
position or in response to investor pressure, concentrate 
on achieving short-term profitability without regard for 
the long-term sustainability of the firm (Duruigbo, 2011: 
531). The current form of managerial short-termism is 
considered to be a product of structural changes caused 
by management compensation practices that developed 
from the agency theory. Short-term employment 
contracts, share-based compensation and the pursuit of 
high share prices by means of high-risk strategies form 
the basis of this compensation system (Sappideen, 2011: 
412), and it is argued that the short-term nature of these 
management compensation practices explains increased 
myopic behaviour by corporate managers.
Independent management myopia refers to short-
termist behaviour intended to provide personal benefits 
at the expense of the company (Laverty, 2004: 832). 
During takeover transactions, for instance, a company’s 
management may exhibit myopic behaviour to ensure its 
own positions are safeguarded, even if it is achieved at 
the expense of the company’s shareholders and other 
stakeholders (Lipton 1979: 112). Corporate managers 
also appear to favour projects that deliver quick results 
since they enhance their reputation (Narayanan, 1985: 
1469) and are perceived to offer a greater degree of 
safety (Hirshleifer & Thakor, 1992: 437). This behaviour 
could be amplified by managerial mobility (Rumelt, 
1987). A manager could be rewarded for the returns 
generated by short-term projects and then exit the 
company before the long-term negative impact of his 
decision becomes evident. By ascribing the short-term 
results to superior management abilities, such a manager 
would also improve his reputation and demand in the 
labour market (Campbell & Marino, 1994: 855).
The compensation periods of many corporate 
managers are very short, with average pay durations of 
1,18 years until senior corporate managers are entitled 
to receive their incentives. Managers with shorter pay 
durations appear more likely to get involved in myopic 
investment behaviour, and this behaviour intensifies 
if a company’s shares are overvalued (Radhakrishnan, 
Milbourn, Song and Thakor, 2010). It could benefit a 
company with poor corporate governance practices 
or overvalued shares to increase the pay duration 
of its corporate managers to reduce potential 
myopic behaviour. Performance-based management 
remuneration is furthermore most effective if a large 
shareholder monitors management’s performance 
(Daines, Nair & Kornhauser, 2005: 18). The presence 
of large foreign institutional investors in countries 
with weak investor protection also appears to reduce 
corporate earnings management substantially (Lel, 2013).
Management myopia resulting from investor 
pressure usually takes the form of earnings management. 
Based on earnings estimates that management provides, 
9investment analysts who monitor a particular company 
determine earnings targets. Failure to meet these targets 
usually results in an immediate decline in a company’s 
share price, in many cases dropping by a substantial margin 
(Millon, 2002: 892). As a result, corporate managers 
believe that capital market behaviour is influenced by a 
company’s ability to meet earnings expectations rather 
than its ability to generate the earnings itself (Fuller & 
Jensen, 2002: 41).
Opposition against the “earnings-per-share mentality” 
(Millon, 2002: 892) adopted by many corporate managers 
has been voiced by leading finance academics for more 
than a decade. Shiller (2002) points out that managers 
should avoid maximising short-term share prices at 
the expense of real, fundamental corporate value, and 
refers to the negative impact their short-term focus has 
on financial performance and employment, while Fuller 
and Jensen (2002: 45) call on management to show 
the courage to confront capital markets by rejecting 
unreasonable demands for short-term earnings at the 
expense of long-term value.
Earnings management is achieved through accounting 
earnings or real earnings management (Dallas, 2012: 
278). Accounting earnings management entails either 
directly manipulating the figures in financial statements, 
or using off-balance sheet transactions to conceal the 
fundamental value of a company (Nelson, Elliott & 
Tarpley, 2003: 17). Real earnings management is an 
attempt to increase earnings by temporarily increasing 
sales or delaying discretionary expenses such as R&D, 
maintenance or marketing (Roychowdhury, 2006: 336). 
Selecting projects that yield immediate results over 
more profitable long-term projects, such as selling a 
division with great future prospects, is another example 
of real earnings management. 
It seems that management has become more adept 
at finding ways to achieve short-term temporary 
earnings increases in response to stricter regulation 
(Koh, Matsumoto & Rajgopal, 2008: 1091). By focusing 
on less tangible discretionary expenses, management 
attempts to conceal its myopic behaviour from capital 
markets (Cohen, Dey & Lys, 2008: 770; Stein, 1989: 
659). Information about managers’ myopic behaviour is 
reflected by the time horizons they emphasise in their 
communication with the market (Brochet, Loumioti & 
Serafeim, 2015). The time horizons they use are linked 
to capital market pressures and the terms of their 
short-term compensation incentives, and also reveal 
information about accounting earnings and real earnings 
management activities within the company.
Although both accounting earnings and real earnings 
management have a negative impact on future financial 
performance, real earnings management practices result 
in greater long-term damage (Mizik, 2010: 594). Reduced 
real investment in order to boost short-term earnings 
and cash distributions to shareholders comes at the 
expense of innovation and future growth opportunities 
(Lazonick, 2014: 48). Evidence has been provided that 
real earnings management activities can be reduced by 
the presence of sophisticated shareholders, such as large 
institutional investors (Roychowdhury, 2006: 335).
Empirical evidence of managerial short-termism 
is provided by the influence that capital markets have 
on companies’ R&D investments. It was found that 
management adjusts its investment in R&D in reaction to 
changes in the company’s market value (Latham & Braun, 
2010: 368). If necessary, management would also limit 
other forms of revenue investment to guarantee short-
term accounting profits that meet earnings expectations 
(Grinyer, Russell & Collison, 1998: 13). Short-termist 
managerial behaviour is therefore confirmed by 
corporate managers’ attempts to ensure that reported 
profits will correspond to a certain level.
A survey among corporate managers in Sweden 
revealed that they perceive lower levels of pressure 
from capital markets than reported in the US. 
Consequently, Swedish companies focused on market 
growth and political uncertainty when evaluating long-
term investments, ensuring a longer-term corporate 
perspective (Segelod, 2000: 243). In contrast to the case 
in the US, managerial myopia is not considered to be a 
significant factor during investment decision-making by 
Swedish corporate managers.
When conducting capital budgeting, a degree of 
managerial short-termism is often incorporated in 
the financial assessment criteria applied. Managers 
frequently use a discount rate much higher than the 
company’s actual cost of capital to evaluate projects 
(Meier & Tarhan, 2007: 3). In addition, they may impose 
relatively short payback-period thresholds (Arnold & 
Hatzopoulos, 2000: 618). Fortunately, the impact of 
imposing such short-termist thresholds appears to be 
limited, as represented by a small amount of value loss 
relative to optimal decision making (Dobbs, 2009: 117).
Based on a UK study it is clear that management is 
willing to sacrifice long-term shareholder value to meet 
earnings expectations or to smooth reported earnings 
(Graham et al., 2005: 4). Managers considered earnings 
(or earnings per share) as the most important metric 
observed by investors. The quarterly earnings for the 
same quarter of the previous year was indicated as the 
most important earnings benchmark, and management 
believed that achieving this benchmark would increase 
the company’s share price over the short run. The 
majority of managers were willing to decrease 
discretionary spending and implement other forms of 
real earnings management. But, most alarmingly, more 
than 80 per cent of the respondents confessed that they 
would sacrifice investment in positive net present value 
projects that are expected to pay off in the long run to 
avoid missing quarterly earnings targets.
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REDUCING SHORT-TERMISM
The interaction between investor and management behaviour observed during periods of speculative 
activity (Bolton et al., 2006) highlights two important 
aspects. Firstly, investor short-termism contributed to 
the implementation of incentives that favoured short-
term behaviour. Secondly, managerial myopia stemmed 
from changes in behaviour caused by these incentives. 
Even though the implementation of inappropriate 
incentives resulted in value-destructive behaviour, it 
also demonstrated that incentives are indeed able to 
influence behaviour (Rappaport, 2011: 7). Consequently, 
adjusting incentives that will induce changes in behaviour 
may prove to be more effective than trying to restrain 
behaviour directly.
It is generally agreed that the most effective way to 
reduce short-termism would be to incorporate longer 
time horizons in the compensation packages of corporate 
managers. Management incentives should reward long-
term value creation rather than short-term performance 
(Pozen, 2014: 2; Rappaport, 2011: 91; Barton, 2011: 86; 
Aspen Institute, 2007: 4). Comprehensive disclosure 
of incentive holding periods (Walker, 2010: 472) and 
including qualitative criteria as part of management 
performance appraisal (Global Network of Director 
Institutes, 2014) could also encourage a more long-term 
orientation.
Combined with longer-term incentives, management 
should furthermore be persuaded to adopt a corporate 
culture focused on achieving sustainable long-term 
value creation (Rappaport, 2011: 127; Global Network 
of Director Institutes, 2014). Increased investment in 
activities that contribute to long-term value, such as R&D 
and infrastructure development, will generate long-term 
benefits that outweigh the negative impact they may have 
on short-term share price performance. Management 
should be assisted to overcome its independent myopia 
and enabled to disregard shareholder pressure when 
facing these long-term investments (Duruigbo, 2011: 
583).
By improving board structures and governance 
practices, underlying agency problems that contribute to 
short-termism could be alleviated (Walker, 2010: 472). 
Companies also need to overcome problems associated 
with dispersed and disengaged shareholding. Corporate 
boards should be strengthened to allow a primary 
focus on long-run value creation that will benefit all 
major stakeholders, empower long-term shareholders 
and ignore pressure from shareholders that are only 
concerned with short-term profits (Barton, 2011: 86). 
Reducing the governance influence of institutional 
investors would undermine corporate accountability, and 
should be avoided even though it is often advocated as 
a way to limit inappropriate intervention by institutional 
shareholders (Pozen, 2014: 2).
Implementing firm-specific measures of long-term 
value to evaluate performance and linking it to incentives 
should ensure that management is encouraged to and 
rewarded for creating sustainable corporate value. To 
extend the corporate focus on long-term value creation 
to its shareholders, the same measures should also be 
employed to communicate long-term objectives and 
strategies to investors, fund managers and analysts 
(Aspen Institute, 2007: 3). Short-term earnings guidance 
(such as public projections of quarterly earnings) should 
be discouraged or supplemented with more meaningful 
disclosure (Pozen, 2014: 2). Corporate financial reporting 
should incorporate reporting practices that relate 
short-term performance with long-term objectives and 
strategies, reflect significant uncertainty by replacing a 
single valuation with a range of estimated values and 
clearly distinguishing between cash flow and accruals 
(Rappaport, 2011: 155). Ensuring greater transparency 
in investor disclosure and encouraging investment 
behaviour consistent with the company’s long-term 
focus on value creation are necessary to address 
underlying causes of short-termism, such as market 
myopia (Aspen Institute, 2009: 5; Global Network of 
Director Institutes, 2014).
To address investor short-termism directly, a number 
of measures aimed at discouraging excessive share 
trading could be considered. Increasing capital gains tax, 
implementing securities transaction tax and volume-
based excise tax could compel short-term investors 
to extend their holding periods. Companies could also 
adopt minimum holding periods or time-based vesting 
by offering increased shareholder participation rights 
in exchange (Aspen Institute, 2009: 3), or distribute 
loyalty dividends to long-term shareholders (Duruigbo, 
2011: 583). The ability of these measures to affect 
significant changes in investor behaviour is, however, 
limited (Pozen, 2014: 2; Stiglitz, 1989: 101; Summers & 
Summers, 1989: 261, Mahoney, 1995: 713).
Alternatively, the time horizons of investment 
managers’ compensation packages could be increased to 
improve the alignment between the interests of financial 
intermediaries and their investors (Rappaport, 2011: 
181; Pozen, 2014: 2). Similar to corporate managers, 
long-term oriented fund managers should be rewarded 
for long-term value creation rather than short-term 
performance (Aspen Institute, 2009: 3), thus reducing 
the potential impact of the double-agency problem 
(Frentrop, 2014: 56).
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CONCLUSION
Our human nature is reflected in our behaviour. As a result, we face the constant conflict between our 
primitive propensity for short-termism and our more 
evolved ability to practise self-control. During this battle, 
carefully considered cognitive decisions are regularly 
defeated by emotionally charged irrational behaviour. 
All too often we have to confess that our behaviour is 
indeed “predictably irrational” (Arielly, 2009).
The business environment has changed dramatically 
over the last two centuries and the pace of technological 
innovation is continuing to accelerate. Our failure to 
acknowledge the impact that our human nature has on 
our financial behaviour has contributed to increasing 
instability and worldwide economic turmoil.
When faced with financial decisions, we need to be 
aware that although we do have the cognitive abilities to 
recognise and overcome the negative impact of short-
termism, our emotions may sometimes prevent us from 
moving “beyond greed and fear”, as stated by Shefrin 
(2002).
Finance and economics have attracted the collective 
blame for the 2007–2009 global financial crisis – those 
in finance charged with causing the crisis and those in 
economics blamed for failing to predict it (Buttonwood, 
2015). As academics in these fields, we have to ensure 
that we address the problems identified during the crisis 
and provide relevant solutions for them.
I want to conclude by borrowing a guiding sentiment 
for researchers from Loewenstein (1996: 289). 
Substituting his references to decision theory with 
finance theory manages to summarise my view on the 
journey we as finance researchers will have to embark 
on:
The dismaying consequence of finance 
theories’ lack of general appeal is a 
widespread tendency for those in the 
humanities and in the general public to fall 
back on outmoded theoretical models. The 
task of finance researchers, as I see it, is to 
try to breathe more life into finance models 
without losing the rigor and structure that are 
the main existing strengths of the perspective. 
Incorporating the influence of our human 
behaviour, I propose, is a step in that direction.
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